The tobacco industry, working through third parties to prevent policy-relevant research that adversely affected it between 1988 and 1998, used coordinated, well-funded strategies in repeated attempts to silence tobacco researcher Stanton A. Glantz. Tactics included advertising, litigation, and attempts to have the US Congress cut off the researcher's National Cancer Institute funding. Efforts like these can influence the policymaking process by silencing opposing voices and discouraging other scientists from doing work that may expose them to tobacco industry attacks. The support of highly credible public health organizations and of researchers' employers is crucial to the continued advancement of public health. 
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Public policy intervention-e.g., aggressive public-education campaigns, mandated smokefree environments, and high cigarette taxes-is the most effective way to reduce tobaccocaused disease. 1, 2 The prosperity of the tobacco industry depends on prevention of these policies and maintenance of a supportive policy environment. Among other strategies for safeguarding its interests, [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] the tobacco industry attempts to counteract or obstruct the work of researchers whose work may be detrimental to tobacco industry interests. 11, 12 To that end, the industry has portrayed targeted researchers as extremist, unqualified, or politically motivated; denigrated researchers to superiors, publishers, and the public; sued researchers; and worked to cut off researchers' funding. The industry pursues these strategies through allied elected officials, front groups, and other third parties. These efforts can influence the policymaking process by silencing voices critical of tobacco industry interests and discouraging other scientists from doing research that may expose them to industry attacks. The case of tobacco control researcher Stanton Glantz, an author of this paper, illustrates the full range of strategies used by the tobacco industry to attack scientists whose work supports tobacco control. Documentation of these events is based on searches between February and November 2006 of the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu), which located approximately 500 documents that described tobacco industry activities pertaining to Glantz's research and funding. Initial search terms included ''Glantz [including misspellings] and funding'' and ''Glantz and NCI [National Cancer Institute],'' followed by searches for specific individuals and groups. We also examined documents from Glantz's own files pertaining to tobacco industry lawsuits against the University of California, San Francisco (where Glantz is a faculty member), media articles concerning Glantz's tobacco-related research, relevant correspondence, and other pertinent materials.
DEATHS FROM SECONDHAND TOBACCO SMOKE
The tobacco industry's monitoring of Glantz's early tobacco-related research appears in a 1990 dossier prepared by law firm Shook Hardy and Bacon in 1990. 13 The dossier describes Glantz's May 21, 1990 , presentation of research (with coauthor William Parmley) at the World Conference on Lung Health, which concluded that secondhand tobacco smoke (SHS) caused approximately 53 000 nonsmoker deaths a year, including 37 000 from heart disease. 14 This presentation led to a full-page New York Times story covering the research, 15 which provoked the Tobacco Institute, the tobacco industry's lobbying and public relations arm, to send the New York Times a 2-page letter to the editor that read, in part: ''The discussion of Glantz's theories as if they were accepted scientific thinking is an error that one does not expect from the New York Times. . . . The reporting was uncritical, unsupportable and unbalanced.'' 16 After the New York Times failed to publish the letter, a number of people wrote letters to the New York Times protesting the paper's failure to publish a response to Glantz and Parmley's conclusions. 17 None of these letter-writers revealed that they were actually members of the Tobacco Institute's secret Scientific Witness Program 18 ( Table 1 ).
The figure of 37 000 cardiac deaths per year from SHS was featured prominently in a US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) technical compendium 69 on SHS published as a supplement to an EPA risk assessment of passive smoking, lung cancer, and respiratory disease. 70 When a draft of the compendium was released 5 months after the New York Times story, tobacco companies raised a furor 11, 71 
THE PHILIP MORRIS PLAN TO ATTACK FUNDING FOR TOBACCO RESEARCH
In 1994, Glantz won a 3-year, $598 686 (total costs) grant from the NCI to evaluate the effects of state and local advocacy on tobaccocontrol policy. 98 Glantz designed these activities to address needs identified in the 1989 US A Philip Morris plan, written after the NCI grant was awarded, discussed Philip Morris' concern with researchers ''who are . . . conducting research which is faulty'' and who ''generate considerable media coverage of these studies.'' 100 It noted that ''the lack of rigorous challenge'' to this research ''creates an on-going problem for PM and the industry,'' and it stated, ''We must change the environment.''
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The plan specifically focused on Glantz (the only researcher mentioned in the plan) and his NCI grant, saying that his grant ''does nothing to advance the common goal of finding cures for cancer'' and ''it is anti-business and anti-jobs. and using third parties to run advertisements attacking scientists:
First, we can take out ads in appropriate scientific journals that point out the flaw(s) in the study in question. While the issue of whose name appears in the ad's disclaimer is a subject for future discussion, there is no doubt that the careful use of these ads would be extremely embarrassing to those scientists whose methodology, data and conclusions are demonstrably wrong. 100 ) As an example of NCI's socalled misuse of taxpayers' money, Ronhovdee cited Glantz's research on the influence that tobacco industry campaign contributions might have on state legislators' policymaking behavior. (Subsequent research established that this influence existed. [109] [110] [111] [112] ) The Ronhovdee report conformed to the strategy Philip Morris explicated in its action plan to generate opposition to public funding of tobacco-control research. 100 Ronhovdee circulated her report to other smokers' rights activists, including Martha Perske and Jackie Miller. 113 Nominally an independent smokers' rights advocate, Perske completed media training at RJ Reynolds 57 and was in direct contact with RJ Reynolds employees and representatives. 59 ''Elevate the issue of using public funds (primarily federal) to conduct anti-tobacco . . . 
LEGISLATIVE APPROPRIATIONS
While laying the groundwork to create the appearance of a grassroots demand to cut Glantz's NCI funding, the tobacco industry was also working to influence the federal budget appropriations mechanism to terminate Glantz's funding. 152 In July 1995, language appeared in a House Appropriations Committee report that set the scene for eliminating Glantz's project in the upcoming NCI appropriations bill. The language focused on a relatively small part of Glantz's overall project (albeit the part to which legislators were likely to be particularly sensitive). It said:
The Committee was disturbed to learn that NCI had funded a research grant studying tobacco industry campaign contributions to State legislators and voting records by those individuals on tobacco control initiatives. While the Committee is not rendering judgment on the merits of the grant proposal, it feels strongly that such research projects do not properly fall within the boundaries of the NCI portfolio.
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The only grant the language could have possibly referred to was Glantz's NCI grant. When the appropriations bill containing NCI's funding for the next fiscal year came to a vote in the House of Representatives on August 4, 1995, it included language (inserted into a subcommittee report) that would specifically strip Glantz of his NCI funding. The legislative affairs manager at the Tobacco Institute described the event in a memo she sent to RJ Reynolds' public affairs divisions the same day: 154 Glantz learned of the attack on his NCI funding from a member of his research staff, whose sister was interning for a member of the House Appropriations subcommittee. On August 2, 1995, Glantz sent a letter to colleagues alerting them about the ongoing political effort to halt his project. He pointed out that, if allowed to continue, this kind of legislative action would have the potential to cut off all future research that the tobacco industry considered threatening. 155 159 The firm also sent the letter to a Philip
Morris corporate attorney in January 1996. 160 The options Arnold and Porter identified are not public because the memorandum containing the options remains privileged, but from the activities that ensued during 1995-1996 legislative appropriations process, it appears that the companies pursued Philip Morris' ''Action Plan,'' especially the strategy to ''reach out to our allies on Capitol Hill, particularly those serving on authorizing and appropriations committees.'' 100 The potential ramifications of the legislators' actions-i.e., the inhibition of publicly funded research opposed by the tobacco industry--troubled many in the public health community and in the broader academic community. The American Cancer Society, the American Heart Association, the American Lung Association, the San Francisco Medical Society, tobaccoprevention coalitions, doctors, attorneys, medical clinic employees, researchers, public health advocates, and prominent academics across the country generated letters and petitions to House and Senate members supporting Glantz and expressing outrage at the federal legislature's interference in NCI's peer-review process. Under the guidance of the Public Media Center, a nonprofit public interest advertising firm in San Francisco, a group of 29 prominent physicians and academics (including former US Surgeon General C. Everett Koop) signed an opinion page advertisement 161 that ran in the October 16, 1995, New York Times defending Glantz and decrying Representative Porter's actions on behalf of the tobacco industry ( Figure 2 ). The president of the American Cancer Society, John Seffrin, personally intervened in the matter of Glantz's NCI grant by mobilizing pressure on Porter in his home district to abandon the effort to target the grant. On April 24, 1996, the House Appropriations subcommittee held formal hearings on the issue, and Richard Klausner, the new NCI director, told the subcommittee that NCI had ceased funding the portion of Glantz's grant involving campaign contributions. 162 (The grant was not cut; these funds were shifted to the grant's other aims.) This action appeared to satisfy the subcommittee. The American Cancer Society made a $74000 grant to Glantz to fund the aim dropped from the NCI grant, and the work continued. Industry attempts to end Glantz's funding did not stop. An August 7, 1996, e-mail from Philip Morris' director of federal tobacco issues to Charles Wall, the company's vice president and associate general counsel, reveals that the industry continued pushing to stop NCI funds from going to Glantz, using the same ''report language'' strategy:
[An RJ Reynolds lobbyist] and I contacted Congressman Henry Bonilla's staffer today about the Glantz grant. She was surprised, especially since she was in the meeting between the head of NCI and Bonilla when it was agreed that NCI would not be funding these type of projects. . . . Bonilla's staffer will communicate with Labor/HHS appropriations subcommittee Chairman John Porter and his staff to express their concern and discuss a recommended plan of attack. . . . Have Porter's subcommittee staff investigate whether it would be more prudent to push for report language which would restrict NCI's ability to use funds for these types of grants in the Senate. . . . Bottom line: determine if report language at Senate or conference level is a viable option. I will meet with Congressman . . . Hoyer's [a friendly Democrat on the subcommittee] staff to solicit his support for a report language strategy that Bonilla and Porter have signed off on. 163 
CALIFORNIANS FOR SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY
In 1994, Glantz and Smith published in the American Journal of Public Health (AJPH) the first comprehensive study of the economic effects of banning smoking in restaurants. 164 The study showed that there was no significant change in restaurant revenues associated with smoke-free environment ordinances. This result directly contradicted the tobacco industry's claim that these laws hurt the hospitality business, an argument they used to frighten members of the hospitality industry into fighting local smoke-free environment ordinances. [165] [166] [167] Philip Morris viewed the 1994 restaurant study as a threat. A 1994 Philip Morris internal report discussing how to spread Philip Morris' ''Accommodation Program'' (a program to stave off smoking restrictions 165 ) lists a number of difficulties Philip Morris faced at the time, among them the fact that ''Stanton Glantz [is] using funding to distribute research stating that there is no negative impact of smoking bans on restaurant sales. . . . Research Many of the strategies that the tobacco industry used to combat Glantz's work mimic the strategies the industry has used to attack other scientists and influence public perceptions. 11, 12, 188, 189 For instance, the industry has repeatedly used secretly paid consultants to cast doubt upon the scientific evidence that SHS is dangerous, as happened with the Whitecoat project, 190 the Asian ETS Consultants Project, 190, 191 194 ; when the company filed a $10 billion lawsuit against ABC News over a 1994 documentary about nicotine manipulation in cigarettes 195 ; and when the company pursued litigation against people working on the American Stop Smoking Intervention Study (ASSIST), a large-scale, NCI-supported smoking intervention trial, and other tobacco-control programs for ''illegal lobbying. '' 196 Unfortunately, tobacco industry documents are frequently the only source of information about how the industry addresses what it perceives as the ''problem'' of scientists who publish research it disagrees with, and the ability to verify information in the documents through other sources is limited. The industry's tendencies toward document destruction may also have left gaps in information. 197 Because an author of this paper was the subject of the activities described, our description is open to accusations of bias; however, the author's experience also provides crucial first-hand information. People who publish research that threatens the tobacco industry's interests and who advocate improved public health policies based on that research may draw intense attention and opposition from the industry. Widespread criticism of a researcher that seems to emanate from a variety of non-tobacco industry sources does not necessarily indicate a lack of tobacco industry involvement, because the industry works to hide its involvement.
The techniques described in this paper were used by the tobacco industry and easily can be used by other industries confronted with issues, including environmental health 198 and global warming. 199 Knowledge of systematic industry harassment of scientists working in a particular field could have a chilling effect on the work of researchers in that field, particularly those who work for smaller institutions or who give a high priority to attracting funding from private industry. 200 Support from researchers' employers and from credible public health organizations (in this instance, the American Cancer Society)--including a willingness to support researchers in fighting litigation and withstanding attacks from political figures and media outlets-is crucial to the continued advancement of science in general and public health in particular. j
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